Judicial security of tenure: the dangers of side-stepping constitutional protections

Abstract

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s decision in Marcia Ayers-Caesar v The Judicial and Legal Service Commission (2025) is, on the one hand, an important reiteration of the importance of judicial independence (a key requirement of the rule of law) through the security of tenure enjoyed by judges under the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago and, on the other, a relatively straightforward matter of constitutional statutory interpretation. It will be argued that this characterisation is deceptive given the differing interpretations as to the ambit of section 137 of the Constitution reached by the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago and the Privy Council. The case concerned an appeal by the Judicial and Legal Service Commission against the decision of the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. The Court of Appeal had held that Marcia Ayers-Caesar (the respondent) had been unlawfully pressured to resign as a judge through the threat of a disciplinary enquiry in the event that she had not tendered her resignation. The Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago and the Privy Council in their decisions were clear that section 137 of the Constitution was the only method available to remove a judge and that the Judicial and Legal Service Commission had sidestepped this important constitutional provision. This article considers the provisions of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago that permit the removal of a judge; the broader context of judicial independence; and analyses the decision of the Privy Council.