Northern Ireland’s post-Brexit governance crisis: what to do when the post-1998 centre cannot hold

Abstract

Northern Ireland’s post-conflict constitutional order was upended by the Brexit referendum result in 2016. In the aftermath of that vote, both Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party have collapsed Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions. Those collapses have differed in the degree to which they were responses to the realities of Brexit, but it suffices to say that the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) has loomed over these successive crises and that it has proven particularly challenging to make Northern Ireland’s constitutional arrangements work without what had been the generally accepted dilution of sovereignty involved in EU membership. The Northern Ireland Protocol, even as amended under the Windsor Framework, has thus far failed to bridge this gap. This article explores the consequent operation of ‘indirect’ rule over Northern Ireland from Westminster and Whitehall in response to this upheaval. Northern Ireland’s institutions have shown themselves to be prone to collapse and difficult to restart, even amid a profound public sector funding crisis which requires urgent attention from elected representatives. This article considers how best to manage Northern Ireland’s governance in such circumstances. This involves an assessment of reforms to power-sharing arrangements, the institution of direct rule and enhancements to indirect rule. Notwithstanding the restoration of power sharing in February 2024, the inherent fragility of power sharing has not been addressed, and this article weighs up whether any of these options provides a meaningful solution in place of the shortcomings of indirect rule’s sticking-plaster arrangements.