The European Union, its Court of Justice and “super-stewardship” in public health

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Abstract

Brownsword et al.’s concept of stewardship relies on the notions of “intervention ladders” and of “productive disconnection” and “intelligent purposive reconnection” between the written texts of the law and developments in science, society and the interface between the two. This article argues that “super-stewardship” (a modified version of stewardship applicable at the supranational level) provides an appropriate standpoint for analysis and assessment of the European Union’s (EU) law and policy-making institutions in the area of public health. The article gives a preliminary illustration of how super-stewardship might be used in this way. The overall argument is that intervention ladders, duly modified, provide a device for analysis or assessment of law and policy-making, and that productive disconnection and intelligent purposive reconnection, duly modified, provide a device for analysis or assessment of adjudication by the EU’s Court of Justice.

Introduction: (super-)stewardship, public health and the EU

“European Court backs ban on Red Bull over health concerns” (7 February 2004)

“EU alcohol ruling cheers traders” (23 November 2006)

“European Court slams Sweden’s alcohol import ban” (5 June 2007)

“Scotch trade body says minimum alcohol pricing breaches EU law” (9 March 2010)

“European Court rules minimum cigarette prices illegal” (20 March 2010)

“Food industry wins battle on ‘traffic light’ labels” (17 June 2010)

Practitioners and academics within the health community have routinely been critical of involvement of the EU and its Court of Justice (the Court) in policy areas concerning healthcare-systems and public health, such as caffeine and vitamin-enhanced foodstuffs,
alcohol and tobacco, as the quotations above, taken from the press, illustrate. The critique advanced is often rather unspecified, to the general effect that the EU’s institutions should not be making such decisions, because the EU is about free trade rather than public health.

But the relationships between the interests of free trade and those of public health protection or promotion are such that a balancing exercise between these interests must be carried out through law and policy-making processes and, where disputes arise, through adjudication. Where states have chosen to become members of an international organisation based on free trade, such as the EU or the World Trade Organization (WTO), that balancing exercise must take place within the rules of such an organisation. In the case of the EU, the direct effect and supremacy of EU law, and the role of the Court in interpreting EU law, as set out in the EU treaties, mean perforce that the balancing exercise will sometimes be carried out by the Court. Furthermore, it is not clear that the Court invariably prefers free trade to public health – both the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) itself and the Court’s jurisprudence recognise the need to protect values other than free trade within the context of the EU’s internal market law.

Therefore, if we seek to assess whether the EU and its Court appropriately consider and weigh public health concerns in their decision-making processes, we need a more developed analytical standpoint from which to do so. The purpose of this article is to consider the

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5 Article 267 TFEU.

6 Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1), 106 TFEU.


extent to which Brownsword’s notion of stewardship, the subject of this special issue, provides such an analytical standpoint.

To this end, the article proceeds as follows. This introduction briefly outlines the concepts of stewardship and public health and the interface between them in the context of the EU. The article is organised into six potential objections to using the concept of stewardship to analyse EU institutional decision-making on public health. The first main section of the article considers the first of two overlapping groups of such objections. This first group of objections arises from claims to the effect either that the EU is in relevant respects no different from a state, or that the EU is too different from a state, and so stewardship does not provide an appropriate model to assess the EU’s activities. To what extent can one key analytical construct of stewardship in the context of public health, that is, Brownsword et al.’s intervention ladder, be used to assess whether the EU’s public health policies (in general) are justified? What modifications to Brownsword et al.’s concept are required?

The focus then turns to the Court. The second main section of the article focuses upon a group of objections to using the concept of stewardship to analyse the jurisprudence of the Court on public health. It considers whether stewardship can be applicable to the Court, as a supranational court, within a particular “constitutionalised” legal order that predominantly values the liberties inherent in the notion of the EU’s internal market. To what extent can a second key analytical construct of stewardship in the context of public health, that is, Brownsword’s notions of productive disconnection and intelligent purposive reconnection, be used to assess whether the Court’s public health decisions are justified? What modifications to Brownsword’s concepts are required?

The two clusters of concerns overlap because the claims about the nature of the Court as a constitutionalised court go to the question of what kind of order or organisation the EU constitutes. The article concludes that no concern discussed justifies rejecting super-stewardship (a modified version of stewardship) as a valuable analytical standpoint by which to assess the EU’s decisions in public health fields. The value of super-stewardship, and in particular the notions of both ladders of intervention and of productive disconnection and intelligent purposive reconnection between the written texts of the law and developments in science, society and the interface between the two, is briefly illustrated throughout the article by reference to EU law concerning threats to public health arising from alcohol, tobacco, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, blood and human tissues.

Stewardship, according to Baldwin, Brownsword and Schmidt’s summary of the notion as developed in the Nuffield Report on Public Health: Ethical issues, can be characterised as follows:

Liberal states have responsibilities to look after important needs of people both individually and collectively. Therefore, states are stewards both to individual people, taking account of different needs arising from factors such as age, gender, ethnic background or socio-economic status, and to the population as a whole . . . [T]he notion of stewardship gives expression to the obligation on states to seek to provide conditions that allow people to be healthy, focusing attention, in particular, on reducing health inequalities.

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10 Nuffield Report, n. 8 above.
11 Baldwin et al., “Stewardship”, n. 9 above, pp. 115–16; Nuffield Report, n. 8 above, p. 25.
This conception echoes the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) *World Health Report 2000*, which considers that stewardship consists in the “ultimate responsibility” of governments for health within a state.\(^{12}\) Brownsword et al.’s conception of stewardship lies somewhere between “libertarian paternalism” and paternalism.\(^{13}\) Their development of stewardship arises from their conviction that both paternalism and libertarian paternalism are inappropriate or problematic models for public health policies. Paternalism as a model for public health policies is insufficiently respectful of individual autonomy and choice. Libertarian paternalism allows too much individual choice, and thus absolves the state from important responsibilities,\(^{14}\) especially to those who would otherwise be disproportionately disadvantaged in health terms by their age, gender, ethnic background or socio-economic status. Stewardship is thus based on equality and proportionality, where policy goals impinge on individual preferences or even individual rights. Stewardship is also based on transparency and participation, not simply representative models of democratic process. It is based on oversight and trusteeship; on governments working in partnership with individuals.\(^{15}\)

For the purposes of this article, by “public health policies”, I mean collective or public activities (regulation, governance, and “steering”) aimed at the protection of the health of the population; and the promotion of good health and the prevention of ill-health among the population.\(^{16}\) So defined, public health policy is a matter of shared competence between the EU and its member states, with the EU having some regulatory power, and also power to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the member states.\(^{17}\) The member states, and in practice the EU,\(^{18}\) also share this responsibility with international organisations, in particular the WHO.\(^{19}\) EU public health policy is formally based on Article 168 TFEU. In general, the EU’s competences in public health, as defined in Article 168 TFEU, are to support and complement those of the member states. The EU has explicit legislative competence only in setting standards of organ and human tissue safety, veterinary and phytosanitary measures, and standards of safety for pharmaceuticals and medical devices.\(^{20}\)


\(^{13}\) Nuffield Report, n. 8 above, pp. 17–25.

\(^{14}\) Ibid. p. 25.


\(^{17}\) Article 5 TEU; Articles 2 and 4(2)(k) TFEU 9 for “common safety concerns in public health matters”, as defined in Article 168 TFEU; Article 6(a) TFEU for “protection and improvement of human health”.


\(^{20}\) Article 168 (4)(a), (b), (c) TFEU.
Is super-stewardship a useful analytical standpoint from which to assess the EU’s institutional decision-making in public health law and policy? The article first considers this question in general, before turning in a later section to a specific focus on the Court.

**Super-stewardship and EU public health law and policy: intervention ladders**

Within their stewardship model, Brownsword et al.’s intervention ladder\(^\text{21}\) provides a tool to consider and justify a range of different policy initiatives. The higher the “rung” on the ladder, the stronger the justification must be. The ladder is as follows (highest rung first):

- eliminate choice;
- restrict choice;
- guide choice through disincentives;
- guide choices through incentives;
- guide choices through changing the default policy;
- enable choice;
- provide information;
- do nothing or simply monitor the current situation.

To what extent might this analytical construct provide a means to assess EU public health law and policy? How might it need to be adjusted?

**Objection 1: Stewardship responsibilities apply to the EU. There is no need to develop an idea of super-stewardship when assessing the EU’s public health policies.**

There are those – notably Giandomenico Majone – who have argued that the EU is already sufficiently “state-like” that we might say that it has stewardship responsibilities *tout court*. Indeed, Brownsword describes the “stewardship jurisdiction” as pertaining to “the regulatory state”,\(^\text{22}\) and Majone, for instance, has described the EU as “a regulatory state”.\(^\text{23}\) If the EU is a regulatory state, for the purposes of public health regulation, then the notion of stewardship, as developed for states, can be applied to the EU, without any need to develop it further.

Moreover, even if we consider that the EU is insufficiently state-like to count as a “state”, we might observe that the function of stewardship is essentially to mediate between different views about the balances between rights, freedoms and regulation in a particular society – in other words, to manage pluralist societies. If we take that functional approach to stewardship, then we can say that the EU embodies a pluralist society or group of societies and so again stewardship per se is perfectly acceptable as an analytical or normative tool to assess EU public health policy. Again, there is no need for a special version of stewardship – super-stewardship – for assessing EU activity.

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21 Nuffield Report, n. 8 above, p. 42.
Objection 2 is the polar opposite of the first objection: Stewardship is the responsibility of states, not of supranational organisations such as the EU

The concept of stewardship implies processes that legitimate public action. For Brownsword et al., and for the WHO, these legitimating processes are implicitly based upon a unitary community (the state). The failure to adopt the Constitutional Treaty, and the provisions of the post-Lisbon Treaty settlement, underline that the EU is a “process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, in which the member states give competence, in the treaties, to attain common objectives, but is not a state. Is stewardship as a concept so state-based that we could not meaningfully talk about the EU being subject even to a modified version of stewardship – super-stewardship?

In response to this objection, we might first observe that, for the purposes of legitimation of public action, it does not matter so much whether the relevant community is a state, or whether it is unitary (and we might argue about whether states can really be described as sovereign “unitary communities”), what matters more is that it functions as a community. The essential basis of stewardship is both the value of community and the values of a community. So far, so good. But, if we translate this into super-stewardship at EU level, which community do we mean? Or do we mean communities? Even the post-Lisbon version of the EU’s treaties talks of the “peoples” of Europe. A small number of writers think there is a “community” of Europeans of which the EU is an institutionalised representation, and which (might) legitimate the EU’s normative powers. But many more are sceptical about such claims, pointing out that they are more aspirational discourse than reflecting present understandings, and that the EU has neither an existing demos, nor even
a telos or “end game” that is a unitary community, but is more about the process of managing communities within a pluralist regime of interacting legal (and political) systems.

The objections to the effect that the EU is not sufficiently state-like to generate the kind of community legitimacy implied by (super-)stewardship are more difficult to dismiss than those that claim that stewardship tout court is inadequate. There is a lot to be said for the view that the EU lacks a unitary demos, or telos involving a community in the singular. However, one way to justify the development of super-stewardship as a standard against which to assess the EU might be to consider the EU as process, perhaps even constitutional, or constitutionalisng, process. The process of either constituting a community and/or mediating between communities (or perhaps just very simply, community as communication within a (constitutionalisng) process) could be claimed to be a sufficient basis for super-stewardship obligations, within an analytical frame for assessing EU public health policy. We could then say that, in spite of the no demos/no community/no legitimacy arguments, there is sufficient community legitimacy – as process – within the EU context to support the application of a modified version of stewardship – super-stewardship – to the EU. The disconnection between “community” in the sense it is applied to a state, and “community” in this process-based sense, as applied to the EU, requires and justifies the modification of stewardship into super-stewardship.

Add to this observation the fact that, although responsibility for public health policy is shared between the EU and its member states, the EU’s legislative powers in this respect are narrow. This narrow range of legislative competence means that we cannot simply transfer the model of stewardship onto the EU institutions, because they do not have sufficient power to fulfil stewardship obligations in the way that states do. However, neither can we say

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that the EU – when it exercises its public health competences – escapes the responsibilities encapsulated in the stewardship concept. A modified model – super-stewardship – encapsulates the nature of the duties on the EU institutions in the context of public health policy. The (admittedly catchy) term super-stewardship captures the relationships between the EU and its member states, echoing terms already used to describe that relationship and the EU’s responsibilities and competences within it, such as “supranational”.

So, for instance, we could use the ladder of intervention to assess the EU’s decisions restricting movements of cattle from the UK during the BSE/vCJD crisis during the late 1980s and the 1990s, or the EU’s blood law and policy. The fact that, at the height of the BSE/vCJD crisis (bovine spongiform encephalopathy/variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease), the EU had within its borders, on a scale at the time undetermined, a new and fatal human disease, the spread of which had not been contained and about which consumers had been misinformed, justified interventions at the highest rung of the ladder – sales of British beef products likely to carry the disease were prohibited. The Blood Safety Directive and Human Tissue and Organs Directives provide for accreditation, authorisation and licensing of establishments that collect human blood, organs or tissues, and establish inspection and quality control requirements with

36 Infamously, the then incumbent UK Minister of Agriculture publicly tried to feed a beefburger to his four-year-old daughter on 16 May 1990.
respect to those establishments. These provisions are designed to ensure traceability of human blood and tissue, to avoid a repetition of the public health scandals that surrounded donation of HIV-contaminated blood in the 1980s and 1990s. Again the significant potential harm to individuals involved justifies an intervention at the highest rung of the ladder – no one can procure or apply human blood or tissue in the EU without being accredited to do so.

Equally, by contrast, we might consider that the EU’s food-labelling regime, with respect to foods that are harmful to human health, for instance, in that they encourage obesity, is insufficiently high up the intervention ladder, in that it only provides information, and indeed, that it does not require all necessary information for consumers to make informed choices. Given the inequalities inherent in obesity as a public health problem in European

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42 Ibid.

43 In spite of regular calls for its introduction from the public health community, the EU has not yet been able to introduce mandatory food-labelling requirements that give full and clear information about the health-related qualities of foodstuff, such as the voluntary “traffic light” food-labelling system, adopted by the UK Food Standards Agency, see www.wearwell.gov.uk/foodlabels/trafficlights/#cat334844 (accessed January 2011). See “Traffic light food labelling: a position statement”, UK Faculty of Public Health www.fph.org.uk/uploads/ps_food_labelling.pdf (accessed January 2011); House of Commons Health Committee, Obesity, Third Report of Session 2003–04 (London: The Stationery Office 2004); EureAct.com www.euract.com/en/food/food-industry-wins-battle-traffic-light-labels-news-495324. Regulation 1169/2011/EU on the provision of food information to consumers OJ 2011 L 304/18 does now include the requirement to provide information on the health impact of food – a “nutrition declaration” (Art 9 (1) (f); Art 30). However, it will not enter into force until 2014, and not until 2016 for the nutrition declarations. It may be that EU food-labelling law is moving in the right direction.
societies, interventions higher up the ladder, for instance, that guide choices towards healthier eating patterns, would be justified under a super-stewardship model.

**Objection 3: But how do we assess whether the EU should be involved at all in blood or human tissue safety regulation?**

Brownsword et al.’s intervention ladder gives no purchase with respect to the question of the “best level” for intervention, or better, within a multi-level and process-based system, such as the EU, the best combination of interventions, be they involving supra-national, national, or sub-national regulatory actors, or leaving matters to individual choice. In addition to the dimension of stewardship that concerns relationships between the individual and the state regulator, which is dealt with by the intervention ladder offered by Brownsword and his colleagues, super-stewardship must also concern itself with the best combination of interventions question.

Most, if not all, public health problems involve, for instance, communicable diseases that cross jurisdictional boundaries, or activity based on large-scale communities, such as immunisation, especially in the context of the abilities of human beings to move freely in an increasingly connected world. In a multi-level and process-based system, such as the EU, the question is not where we should place the entry point of a best-level intervention ladder. Rather, it is – to continue with the metaphor of ladders – about how many rungs on the ladder of institutional interactions a policy process should involve. Should public health decisions be left only to individuals? Should policy be made through interactions involving actors at local and national levels? Or should policy decisions be taken involving interactions with other levels, such as the international (the WHO) or the EU?

Brownsword et al.’s intervention ladder for assessing the relationship between individual and state regulator has individual autonomy and choice as its baseline, and the further from the base a proposed intervention, the higher the justification involved. What is the appropriate baseline for our multi-level ladder of intervention? One possible baseline, provided within EU law itself, is the doctrine of subsidiarity. That would also begin at the level of the individual and involve requiring increasingly greater justification for any intervention with individual rights or freedoms that involves interactions with increasingly larger groups above that level. So, for instance, we might say that each local community should be empowered to define its public health policy, through interactions with individuals within that community. Policies formed through interactions between local and national-level institutions require greater justification. However, given the community-based nature of public health, there is an argument to be made that the starting point on the multi-level intervention ladder should be at national level. Indeed, it could equally be argued that, given the fact that public health problems do not stop at state boundaries, as indeed the existence of international organisations such as the WHO attests, the starting

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45 Article 5(3) TEU.
46 For instance, towns or cities that are hot spots for communicable diseases, such as swine flu, should be able to define their own swine flu policy, and national policy that harmonises such policies must be justified.
point should be international level, and policy processes that fail to include this rung of the multi-level intervention ladder should justify this exclusion.

What matters for this article, however, is that whichever of these possible starting points were adopted, there would be a need to justify public health policy interventions involving EU (as opposed to national or international) actors. One possible approach to this justification would be to say that where the member states of the EU share sufficient contours of a particular public health problem – say, obesity – which are not shared globally, that EU-level (as opposed to international or national) involvement is justified. Alternatively, where other EU laws or policies (such as in agriculture; the environment; or the EU’s internal market) have an EU-specific effect on public health, EU-level policy would also be justified. In other words, justification would be by reference to the need to protect the health of a community or group of communities beyond that of the nation state, but falling short of the global community.

Under super-stewardship, the multi-level ladder of intervention would be as follows (highest rung first). Inclusion of one rung implies a process of interactions between all the rungs below it. Again, the higher the rung, the greater the need for justification.

- decide rules or policies involving institutions or actors at EU level;
- decide rules or policies involving international level institutions (especially in this context, the WHO);
- decide rules or policies involving national level institutions and actors;
- decide rules or policies involving sub-national institutions and actors;
- individual decisions.

It is worth noting that the order of rungs on the best-level ladder appears to be counter-intuitive, in that EU level policies require a greater justification than international policies. Indeed, where EU policy departs from rules or policies determined by interactions between actors on the other four rungs of the ladder (e.g. WHO guidance), the greatest justification is required. This is because of the nature of public health protection, as a global activity, and the commonality of disease to humanity, rather than regionally based groups of human beings. If EU policy does not simply follow WHO policy, for example, this must be justified. The implication here is that the strongest justification must be advanced if EU-level institutions are to be involved in public health policy decisions. So, for instance, the development of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), which seeks to coordinate responses to communicable diseases within the EU, would need to be justified by reference to super-stewardship. It is not at all clear what “added value” the ECDC brings to the work of national disease control institutions and the work of WHO Europe. Equally, for instance, it is not clear that the EU’s involvement in the swine flu epidemic in 2009 was justified. The public health threat was global, there was nothing in particular about the problem that mandated an EU response. On the other hand, for instance, the long-standing common agricultural policy, as well as the EU’s internal market

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47 This is also supported by the post-Lisbon “mainstreaming” obligation with respect to human health, see Article 9 TFEU.
48 Such as SARS, avian flu, swine flu.
50 See e.g. M Cardwell, The European Model of Agriculture (Oxford: OUP 2004).

The discussion so far has shown that a modified version of stewardship provides a valuable analytical tool to assess the EU’s public health law and policy. The shared competence for public health policy between the EU and its member states justifies the application of Brownsword’s intervention ladder in terms of assessing the content of policy. Super-stewardship – the obligations of stewardship translated to a supranational context – requires the development of a second intervention ladder, which is concerned with which levels of intervention are appropriate for policy development and implementation.

**Super-stewardship and the Court in public health: productive disconnection and intelligent purposive reconnection**

The second main part of the article considers the extent to which the observations made so far – that super-stewardship provides a credible analytical standpoint to assess the actions of the EU’s institutions – apply to the Court of Justice of the EU.

**Objection 4: Stewardship doesn’t impose obligations on courts.**

At first glance, in both the WHO World Report 2000 and in Brownsword’s work, especially in the Nuffield Report, stewardship seems to be about the state’s responsibility as regulator – what seems to be intended is the responsibilities of legislatures and administrative authorities, and those bodies to whom they delegate legislative and administrative competence.\footnote{For instance, Baldwin et al., “Stewardship”, n. 9 above, assert that, under a stewardship model, “public health programmes should . . .” – in other words stewardship is a tool for assessing programmes, not adjudication.} Moreover, public health (in common with some other fields such as the regulation of new technologies) seems to be a field where the legislature and executive both set and hold the regulatory position. It does not appear that courts are involved centrally in this process at all. Thus, stewardship does not at all seem to be about courts, still less the supranational/constitutional Court of Justice of the EU.

But we can dismiss this objection quite quickly, as, although the WHO’s and Nuffield Report discussion of stewardship appears to be only about legislative or administrative
activities, Brownsword himself deals (implicitly) with how stewardship obligations apply to courts at length in *Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution*. Given the lag or gaps between regulation and the development of new technologies; new knowledge and understanding of the world; and new social or cultural practices, courts have to deal with “regulatory disconnection”. Courts acting as interpreters of the law have what are essentially stewardship obligations to consider whether to adopt a creative approach to interpretation, and “reconnect” law to developments; or to adopt a more conservative approach in order to prompt the legislature to fill the “regulatory void” that will become apparent by leaving the law and developments disconnected. Courts are required to act as stewards of the regulatory compact by distinguishing between “unproductive” and productive disconnection. For Brownsword, productive disconnection arises where there is a genuine question about whether, and how, developments in science and society fit within the spirit and intent of the regulatory scheme. In those circumstances, courts act as stewards when they decline to use creative or purposive interpretation to solve a problem that really needs to be addressed through law and policy-making processes. “Reconnection” of law with developing science in society, by courts adopting purposive interpretations of legislative texts, is only “intelligent” or “smart” in Brownsword’s terms if the disconnection is merely “descriptive” and “unproductive”. Otherwise, courts should maintain the disconnections, as these will produce a realignment of the regulatory arrangements through legislative activity. Whether courts adopt a purposive approach depends upon how they judge the “regulatory tilt” – in other words the default position set by regulators. Courts have stewardship responsibilities to consider their role (through avoiding creative interpretations that “paper over the cracks”) in re-opening debates that legitimate regulatory choices in pluralist societies.

Now, when we think about this stewardship role of courts, and its relationship with the stewardship role of the legislature, in terms of the Court and the EU legislature, the first obvious difference between the EU and a state is that the EU legislature is hopelessly slow at responding to changing scientific knowledge and information, or cultural practices, because it is full of veto points (significantly more so than national legislatures). The EU legislative processes have been widely criticised as being insufficiently legitimate, including where the EU legislat in areas such as public health, where law interfaces with science and

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53 RRTR, n. 22 above, ch. 6, “The challenge of regulatory connection”.
54 Ibid. pp. 166–7, 184.
56 RRTR, n. 22 above, p. 167.
57 Where the descriptions in law or policy decisions no longer correspond to developments in science and/or society, ibid. p. 166.
58 Where developments in science and society are within the spirit and intent of law (or policy decisions), although not in the letter of the law, ibid. p. 167, see also p. 183.
59 Ibid. p. 184
60 Ibid. p. 172–3
These features of the EU legislative process might mean that we need a different calibration of purposive reconnection for the Court. Brownsworth’s purposive reconnection is based upon an assumption that the legislature will intervene, within a reasonable timeframe, to fill the gap and reconnect the law and the new development. It also assumes that the legislative process is legitimate and appropriate. To make those assumptions in the context of EU legislation is problematic. For instance, we might point to the more than 10 years that it took the EU to agree the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, and the significant discussion with respect to its legitimacy in doing so, or the protracted, highly contested (and ongoing) legislative process concerning EU-level regulation of tobacco and its advertising. Because of these...
features of the EU legislative process, super-stewardship – a version of stewardship adjusted for the Court – might involve a greater degree of “unproductive disconnection”, and thus an enhanced role for judicial creativity. Whether we want to entrust the Court with this responsibility is a matter of disagreement. But super-stewardship and an obligation to consider a recalibrated choice between intelligent purposive reconnection and productive disconnection could provide a yardstick by which to assess whether the Court is properly discharging such responsibility.

**Objection 5: Most of the EU’s public health policy involves only policy, or at best, soft law. The scope for Court involvement is minimal.**

The EU’s public health policy, as discussed so far in this article, defined by reference to Article 168 TFEU, is administered by the European Commission’s Directorate General (DG) for Health and Consumers (SANCO). DG SANCO seeks to work with various EU agencies with responsibilities for specific public health fields, such as food safety, environmental protection and communicable diseases. DG SANCO has had some success, especially in awareness-raising of high priority health issues, through operating discrete, niche, public health programmes, such as those on cancer and environmental protection.

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69 For discussion of the roles of agencies in the EU, see e.g. D Geradin, R Muños and N Petit (eds), Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A new paradigm of European governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2005); Vos, Institutional Frameworks, n. 51 above; O De Schutter, N Lebessis and J Paterson (eds), Governance in the European Union (Luxembourg: European Communities 2001).


HIV/AIDS. Although the programmes have extremely modest budgets, they have provided guidelines and positive incentives for change at the national health policy level. Nevertheless, because much of this policy is based on programmes and soft law, the scope for involvement of the Court in EU health policy in this narrow sense is minimal. To what extent can stewardship apply to the Court if its adjudicatory role in EU public health policy is so minimal?

To the objection that much of EU public health policy does not involve hard law, and so Court involvement is minimal, we might observe that, in addition to the EU's public health policy in this narrow sense, many other policies directly relevant to public health also fall within the scope of EU activity. For example, EU law and policy on illicit drugs has been developed within its policy on “freedom, security and justice”.

Responsibility for the EU's borders, a vital defence against smuggling of narcotics and tobacco, resides with DG Justice. EU food safety policy, and policy on the EU’s food supply, important for public health questions such as obesity, has been developed through the common agricultural policy, and responsibility for food safety now resides with the European Food Safety Authority. Public health research, of which the European Union is now a major funder, is the responsibility of DG Research, while consistent Europe-wide information on health and its determinants is collected by Eurostat. Health and safety at work is covered by DG Employment. The EU's long-standing environmental policy, with a significant body of


78 See n. 70 above.


environmental law involving matters such as air and water quality, waste disposal, and noise pollution, all with direct consequences for public health, falls under the auspices of DG Environment. Several of these policy areas, which relate to the EU’s contribution to public health protection and promotion, include binding legal norms, and therefore there is scope for the Court to be involved in their interpretation and application through its jurisdiction, especially that under Article 267 TFEU. Where the Court interprets that law, we can consider the extent to which it complies with the obligations of stewardship.

Secondly, though, and more important, in terms of the contribution of the Court to public health protection or promotion within the EU, is the interface between internal market law and public health. Internal market law aims to create and sustain the conditions of free movement of the factors of production, and free and fair competition, within the geographical territory of the EU. Because of relationships between public health and free availability or free circulation of certain types of products or services which may jeopardise public health, internal market law exerts a major influence on public health. This influence is both in terms of general safety of products and services, and in terms of specific products which have a particularly detrimental effect upon public health; and services, such as advertising services, related to those products. In particular, the application of internal market law to tobacco and alcohol has had profound implications for national laws, regulations and administrative practices and policies dealing with those products, and the advertising of these products, as part of national public health policies.

Internal market law thus represents the most important site of engagement of the Court with public health. Internal market law is not simply deregulatory. It allows for the protection of public interests other than the interest in free trade and open competition. But national rules, administrative practices or policies that have the effect of impeding cross-border trade in goods or services have to be justified within the terms of internal

84 Recently, for instance, the Court has considered whether national rules, prohibiting the import of blood products from donations which were not entirely unpaid, breach internal market law, see Case C-421/09 Humanplasma 9 December 2010, nyr in ECR.
86 For instance, internal market law forced Finland to dismantle elements of its state alcohol monopoly and, shortly afterwards, it reduced domestic prices as a consequence of its inability to block imports of cheap drinks from nearby Estonia. As predicted, there has been a steep rise in deaths from alcohol-related disorders, see A Koski, R Sirén, E Vuori and K Poikolainen, “Alcohol tax cuts and increase in alcohol-positive sudden deaths: a time-series intervention analysis” (2007) 102(3) Addiction 362–8. Proposals in 2009 by the Scottish government and the chief medical officer for England to impose a minimum price on alcohol prompted the proposed use of EU litigation to challenge such measures, see M McKee, P Belcher and T Hervey, “Reducing harm from alcohol” (2009) BMJ 338, b1191.
market law. The Court is charged with oversight of that process and the balancing of values it implies. Through applying legal principles, such as that of non-discrimination and proportionality, in determining whether national public health policies are justified, the Court determines the extent to which public health interests can be articulated, and protected, within the constraints of internal market law. This broad sense of EU public health policy is thus where a stewardship obligation could most obviously apply to the Court in the field of public health.

Moreover, in the context of internal market law, there is a stronger reason than the “regulatory lag” phenomenon discussed above to adopt a different calibration of or approach to intelligent purposive reconnection/creative interpretation and to productive disconnection/literal interpretation to that provided by the stewardship model – a super-stewardship model. The reason concerns the constitutional position of the core provisions of directly effective88 internal market law. Being part of the TFEU, these measures of EU law cannot be amended except by treaty revision and, in fact, the core provisions have not been amended89 in the entire lifetime of what is now the EU.90 Treaty revision involves an even more difficult process than adoption of EU legislation, with every member state enjoying a veto. In practice, therefore, creative interpretation is a primary means by which these measures of EU law can be altered through time and in response to new challenges or developments, including those in the public health field.

Internal market law enjoys a position of “constitutional asymmetry” in the EU’s legal order. As several authors, notably Fritz Scharpf,91 have argued, the law of the internal market embeds a constitutional favouring of free trade interests as opposed to other interests, including those of “social Europe”, such as employment conditions and social welfare provision. The constitutional asymmetry can also be said to extend to interests such as public health protection and promotion. While I have been (and remain) sceptical about the “strong” version of the constitutional asymmetry argument (in brief, because it reflects an insufficiently nuanced understanding of the way that the jurisprudence of the Court actually works in practice), I think that a “weak” version of the argument stands. It is not that EU law, as interpreted and applied by the Court and national courts, is always deregulatory and always favours free trade interests over other interests. The possibility to

87 Article 36 TFEU; Articles 52 and 62 TFEU; Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, n. 7 above; Case C-55/94 Gebhardt [1995] ECR I-4165.
88 That is, a measure that can be relied upon in litigation before a national court.
89 Save by renumbering.
90 Witness the difficulties of the French to ensure that the “Anglo-Saxon model” was headed off by the Treaty of Lisbon – although there are new provisions about “services of general interest”, and although the term “competition” alone was removed from the provision about the aims of the EU, to be replaced with an aim of “a highly competitive social market economy”, Article 3(3) TEU.
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_justifies_ restrictive regulatory activities remains available. It is the fact that the discussion of the matter becomes framed by the discourse of internal market law, and indeed, in the context of the EU’s membership of the WTO, also by the discourse of WTO law. This framing effect may discourage or impede courts from articulating arguments on any basis other than that of liberalism, and result in the resolution of disputes within a pluralist society articulated only in terms of free trade and markets. As I expressed it in the context of the _Diane Blood_ litigation, concerning export of frozen sperm from the UK to a Belgian fertility clinic in circumstances where the use of the sperm would have been unlawful in the UK: the applicability of E[U] law may operate to constrain, or to skew in certain directions, debates (including those carried out through litigation) in the Member States concerned with [public health] . . . the application of E[U] law may encourage or at least enable national courts to resolve cases by applying economic concepts, for instance relating to trade in goods and services. The European Union legal order, with its underlying principles of market openness, and conceptualisation of individuals as market actors, might aid this type of approach. Indeed, the _Blood_ case may be an example of such an interplay between national and European regulatory orders. The Court of Appeal’s judgment makes scant reference to the justification issue, perhaps sending a signal that it viewed Diane Blood’s rights in E[U] law as indisputable, which was clearly not the case . . . it was at least arguable that a public interest justification could have been found to support the Authority’s refusal to allow Diane Blood to export the sperm._92

The way that EU law (and indeed WTO law) frames non-free trade interests, such as public health protection and promotion, is as _exceptions_ to the (liberal) norm of freedom of movement._93_ Stewardship obligations in the public health context require a quite different framing. The possibility of “reconnection” of the gap between emergent understandings of what is needed for public health protection with the relevant internal market law is not feasible through legislative amendment – the place of the internal market is “constitutionally embedded” within EU law. This embeddedness suggests that the Court, if exercising a super-stewardship approach, should hesitate to adopt literal interpretations of the relevant regulatory system/strategy (i.e. internal market law), where these will not and cannot protect public health, on the basis that “this is for the legislature to fix”. The disconnection between internal market law and public health protection is “unproductive”, because the EU legislature cannot “fix” internal market law in that sense. Thus, if the Court is to act as a super-steward, we would expect from it greater creative interpretation of internal market law, so as to “reconnect” internal market law with emergent understandings of how best to protect and promote public health within the EU.

**Objection 6: Super-stewardship cannot serve as a model to assess the contribution of the Court in the field of internal market law, because stewardship and the internal market do not share a common frame of reference.**

The final objection to applying super-stewardship as a model or analytical framework to assess the work of the Court of Justice of the EU in determining the balance between free trade/fair competition and public health, discussed in this article, relates to the point above.

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It concerns the very different frames of reference of stewardship and the internal market, encapsulated in the following quotations:

Once we venture beyond the gated and secure conditions of a community of rights, stewardship might prove to be a hostage to fortune ...\(^\text{94}\)

The [European] Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured ... The [European] Union shall establish an internal market\(^\text{95}\) ... The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured ...\(^\text{96}\)

The model of stewardship offered by Brownsword et al. operates essentially within a framework of constraint of state or public action, within a closed (“gated and secure”) “community of rights” (a state). The main addressees of stewardship are public authorities\(^\text{97}\) and individuals who may be more or less healthy, and their “personal values”. By contrast, the way that the Court, when operating within the frame of reference of internal market law, conceptualises individuals (with their particular health needs and personal values) is as consumers (and producers) operating within an open (“without internal frontiers”) internal market. Individuals are not conceptualised here as human beings with health needs and choices relating to health. This conceptualisation or framing is inherent in the nature of internal market law, or at least internal market law as developed hitherto by the Court. Thus, the Court’s jurisdiction in internal market law and the idea of stewardship each involve a totally different frame of reference – one is about values within an implicitly closed community; the other is about the implicitly valued openness of the EU’s internal market. If we try to apply stewardship to the Court, the objection is that we will essentially be requiring the Court to ignore the constitutional framework within which it is obliged to operate, and apply a different framework (which respects the values encapsulated in the idea of stewardship, including not only autonomy but also substantive equality, which means different treatment for those who are more vulnerable). It is not legitimate to criticise an apple for not being a pear!

In response to this objection, we might observe that stewardship is used precisely to justify and respond to an “overly individualistic focus that has emerged as canonical ... over recent decades”.\(^\text{98}\) The very nature of public health goods is such that they can often outweigh liberal ideas about protecting individual liberties and freedoms,\(^\text{99}\) including those pertaining to the creation and maintenance of the EU’s internal market. So, just as


\(^{95}\) Article 1 TEU.

\(^{96}\) Article 26(2) TFEU.

\(^{97}\) Of course, in the public health domain, we might wonder whether the state/public domain is really so distinct as it perhaps once was from the private domain. For instance, several (Beveridge model) national health authorities within the EU have experimented with contracting out services to private actors. The Bismarkian model health authorities have always used (at least quasi) private actors, such as insurance organisations. For discussion of the different arrangements for public health care in the EU’s member states, see e.g. W Palm, J Nickless, H Lewalle and A Coheur, Implications of Recent Jurisprudence on the Coordination of Health Care Protection Systems (Brussels: AIM 2000); V Hatzopoulos, “Health law and policy: the impact of the EU”, in G De Búrca (ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State: In search of solidarity (Oxford: OUP 2005), pp. 111–68; M Steffen, Health Governance in Europe: Issues, challenges and theories (London and New York: Routledge 2005). M Flear, Does the Free Movement of Persons Cause Change in Healthcare Systems?, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK, 2006.

\(^{98}\) Baldwin et al., “Stewardship”, n. 9 above, p. 114.

\(^{99}\) Ibid.
stewardship is precisely about justifying or assessing departures from freedoms within a particular state, so we could use the same sort of reasoning, in the modified form of super-stewardship outlined above, to justify departures from freedoms (free movement, freedom to trade) within the internal market, and the individual rights in EU internal market law, that the Court must interpret and national courts must apply. Understood thus, a super-stewardship obligation would not only empower, but also require, the Court to reframe disputes concerning the balance between free trade and public health, so as to consider, by reference to the ladder of intervention, whether restrictions on free trade (at the “do nothing” rung of the ladder) are justified, and, by reference to the best-level ladder of intervention, who gets to decide.

By way of illustration, this final section of the article considers how super-stewardship, as outlined above, could be used as a standpoint for analysis and critique of the Court in the context of its jurisprudence on public health protection within EU internal market law. Obviously, the examples discussed here are selective. They are based on a review of the Court's caselaw in public health fields, from the 1950s to 2009.100

In its early jurisprudence, the Court recognised that public health was essentially a matter for national administrations, allowing a wide margin of discretion to member states in this respect. As the Court put it, in a case involving national rules restricting the sale of medicinal products to pharmacies:

it is for the Member States, within the limits imposed by the Treaty, to decide what degree of protection [for human health] they intend to assure and in particular how strict the checks to be carried out are to be.101

The Court's interpretation here of internal market law may be characterised as intelligent purposive reconnection. At this point in time, there are no EU-level rules on selling arrangements for pharmaceuticals, nor is the creation of such rules by the EU legislature envisaged. The Court thus operates within a super-stewardship model by interpreting internal market law to give significant regulatory space to national administrations. The national policy at issue here is relatively high up the ladder of intervention, involving a de facto restriction of individual choice, by restricting the places in which certain products, deemed by the national administration to be potentially harmful to public health, can lawfully be sold. But the restriction of choice is justified by reference to understanding at the time of the harm or potential harm to public health were pharmaceuticals to be sold to consumers outside the setting of a pharmacy, where professionally qualified staff can give tailored advice to offset the information deficit that the consumer of pharmaceuticals has, and to prevent a future charge on national healthcare systems if pharmaceuticals are consumed and harm to the consumer's health ensues. The question of whether that extent of intervention with individual liberty (to trade) is justified — and, crucially, who gets to decide — is informed also by the best-level ladder of intervention. In the absence of either EU-level or internationally agreed rules on selling arrangements for pharmaceuticals, and given the fact that pharmaceuticals markets were essentially national, the decision to permit national-level rules or policies is justified.

However, mindful that allowing too wide a discretion to member states in this respect would have completely undermined the Court's drive to create the internal market in

100 I am grateful to Michelle Dunning for her research assistance under the University of Sheffield CILASS SURE Summer Intern Scheme 2009.
goods, the Court has also, through the principle of proportionality, developed some control over national public health protection policies. National regulation is permitted in EU law, subject to the proviso that such regulation is proportionate to the aims of the internal market. There are essentially two versions of the proportionality test (a stronger and a weaker test), and the Court has applied different versions at different points in time to its scrutiny of the balance between free trade as implied by the logic of the internal market and protection of public health.

From the beginning of the 1970s, into the mid-1980s, the Court applied the weaker version of the proportionality test to its scrutiny of national measures designed to protect public health. For instance, in cases involving national rules designed to protect against known and agreed risks to human health – e.g. from pesticides in food, or from certain levels of active coliform bacteria and active micro-organisms in milk products – the Court stresses that there is a known risk to human health, that harmonised EU law on the products concerned is incomplete and that therefore different member states may adopt different approaches without breaching EU law. For instance, the Court explained:

In so far as the relevant [EU] rules do not cover certain pesticides, the Member States may regulate the presence of residues of those pesticides on foodstuffs in a way which varies from one country to another according to the climatic conditions, the normal diet of the population and their state of health.

The weaker version of proportionality also applied in cases where the science was less clear. For instance, in Rewe-Zentralefinanz eGmbh v Landwirtschaftskammer, the Court held that the different treatment of imported and domestic products does not breach EU law, so long as effective measures prevent the distribution of contaminated domestic products and there is reason to believe that there is a risk of harmful organisms spreading without inspection of imported products. There was no need to prove the risk – it was enough to

102 If member states could adopt any national policies they wished, simply by invoking the grounds, however spurious, of human health protection, then the single market would be easily thwarted by protectionist national rules.
104 W Sauter, “Services of general economic interest and universal service in EU law” (2008) 33 European Law Review 167–93. In the weakest version, a measure that is prima facie suitable to protect public health, and is not manifestly disproportionate, is permissible. In the strictest version, only the least restrictive means of protecting public health are permissible, and the relevant body must show that no other imaginable measure could achieve that objective with a lesser detrimental effect to free trade.
106 Case 97/83 Meikaniis, n. 101 above.
107 Case 54/85 Mirepoix, n. 105 above, para. 15.
109 Para. 8.
show that it was reasonable for the national administration to believe it existed. This softer version of proportionality continued in cases throughout the 1980s.110

Again we can say that the Court adopts intelligent purposive reconnection here, leaving regulatory space for national administrations to protect and promote public health within the context of the “letter” of internal market law. The restriction or elimination of choice entailed in the regulatory structures at issue in these cases (which involved matters such as bans on additives in food), which is relatively high on the intervention ladder, is justified by the reasonable belief that serious risks to human health are present, although in precautionary examples such as these the case is less strongly persuasive than that outlined in the example above. Again the best-level ladder of intervention, given that there is a lack of EU-level regulation of the matters concerned, indicates that national levels are the appropriate level within which the procedures whereby the different interests at stake are balanced should take place.

However, by the early 1990s, the Court began to modify its jurisprudence in this field, by adding a procedural dimension to its application of proportionality. So in a series of cases involving the addition of sorbic acid,111 the nutrient L-Carnitine,112 and the nutrient Co-enzyme Q10,113 the Court’s position moved towards a stricter version of proportionality, by scrutinising the transparency, speed and accessibility of the national marketing authorisation procedures at issue. The context for this development is the fact that the EU had by this time incrementally developed its own regulatory capacity to adopt law and policy on at least some sources of risk to human health, in particular within the food chain.114 Originally, following decisions taken by member states, the EU began to

110 See e.g. Case 174/82 Sandoz, n. 101 above; Case 53/80 Eyssen [1981] ECR 409; Case 247/84 Motte, n. 101 above; and Case 304/84 Müller, n. 101 above. In Case 174/82 Sandoz, n. 101 above, the Court reasoned: “In view on the one hand of scientific uncertainties and on the other of the fact that the harmfulness of vitamins depends on the quantity absorbed with the whole nutrition of a person it is not possible to say with certainty whether any food to which vitamins have been added is harmful or not” and “Scientific research does not appear to be sufficiently advanced to be able to determine with certainty the critical quantities and the precise effects” (paras 10–11, emphasis added). Similar reasoning is found in Case 53/80 Eyssen [1981] ECR 409: “It is indeed accepted that the increasingly widespread use of that substance, not only in milk but also in numerous preserved products, has revealed the need, both at national level in certain countries and at international level, to study the problem of the risk which the consumption of products containing the substance presents, or may present, to human health” and “although these studies have not as yet enabled absolutely certain conclusions to be drawn regarding the maximum quantity of nisin which a person may consume daily without serious risk to his health” (para. 13, emphasis added).


112 Case C-24/00 Commission v France (Red Bull) [2004] ECR I-1277.

113 Case C-95/01 Greenbaum and Abel [2004] ECR I-1333.

114 These activities related to the common agricultural policy, a policy area that was originally seen as rather separate from internal market law. In 1964, the Commission set up “a panel of veterinary experts”, to recommend whether infected bovines or swine could lawfully be prohibited entry into a member state, Directive 64/432/EEC, OJ 1964 L 121/1977, Article 10. The Standing Committee on Foodstuffs was set up in 1969, Decision 69/414/EEC OJ 1969 L 291/9. These bodies now form part of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (Regulation 178/2002/EC, as amended, n. 51 above), within the European Food Safety Authority. Originally deciding on matters that seem only technical (e.g. whether a particular additive counts as a “colour” for the purposes of EU legislation (Directive 94/36/EC OJ 1994 L 237/13); whether additives are being used in accordance with EU legislation (Directive 95/2/EC OJ 1995 L61/1), over time these comitology procedures built up a body of EU-level decisions about the risk to human health of various food additives and hazards in food (including toxins and biological hazards such as bacterial pathogens/zoonotic agents). So, for instance, in 2002, the Commission adopted a decision that the additive Konjac (E425) was no longer authorised within products marketed in the EU. See Holland and Pope, EU Food Law, n. 51 above, pp. 55–6.
develop its own idea of scientific knowledge informing tolerable (and intolerable) levels of risk concerning human health within the food chain. The Court’s jurisprudence, developing an increasingly suspect position towards nationally determined versions of hazard, supports this EU-level legislative and policy development.

In these circumstances, the question is whether, considering the best-level ladder of intervention, the EU level is the appropriate level within which decisions about risk should be made. The products concerned are not the subject of global restrictions or bans on their trade. But is there sufficient commonality between the member states of the EU in terms of the contours of the public health problem being tackled here, which is not shared globally, so as to justify special EU-level rules protecting the health of a community or group of communities beyond that of the nation state (the EU), but falling short of the global community? Is there an EU-level law or policy that significantly interfaces with public health protection? If there is (the common agricultural policy and the EU’s food law probably constitute such policies), then the Court’s approach in supporting the emergent EU-level law and policy is justified. We might, for instance, suggest that a European social and cultural approach to food additives exists, and justifies the EU level of intervention. However, if such a case cannot be made out, then a super-stewardship analysis would suggest that this is a matter best left to national levels.

Moreover, the way that the Court reasons in its jurisprudence concerning the interface between the internal market and public health is insufficiently sensitive to the ladder of

115 Such knowledge being not only scientifically, but also socially and politically constructed, see Jasanoff, Designs on Nature, n. 63 above.

116 Such as, for example, nuclear or chemical weapons, or narcotics. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 1993 www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/ aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by states. Private trade in chemical or nuclear weapons is de facto prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (with 34 members) www.mtcr.info/english/index.html; the Wassenaar Arrangement (with 40 members) www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html; the Nuclear Suppliers Group (with 46 members) www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/03-member.htm; and the Australia Group (with 41 members) www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html. The UN has been working towards an Arms Trade Treaty, and agreement in principle was reached in October 2009. See www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/weapons/arms-trade-treaty/. The UN’s Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/single-convention.html#ref就意味着把占有权，使用，贸易，分布，进口，出口，生产或制造，应排除医疗和科学目的。联合国关于精神药物的公约1971 www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/psychotropics.html#ref就意味着在精神药物中建立一个国际控制体系。

117 This might, for instance, be illustrated by the different approaches to genetically modified food and food ingredients in Europe as opposed to in the USA. Putting it simply, the USA considers that genetically modified products are essentially similar to non-genetically modified products, whereas the EU, though conceding that GM products are “like products”, argues that their different production processes justify regulation and an exemption from the application of WTO law. Discussion of these differences has taken place in the context of whether the EU rules are compliant with WTO obligations, and within the WTO dispute settlement arrangements, in particular EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products Complaints by the USA, Canada and Argentina (WT/DS291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/DS293/R 29 September 2006). See the reviews in R Howse and P Mavroidis, “Europe’s evolving regulatory strategy for GMOs: the issue of consistency with WTO law: of kine and brine” (2000) 24 Fordham International Law Journal 317–70; J Scott, “European regulation of GMOs and the WTO” (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 213–39; J G Carrau, “Lack of sherpas for a GMO escape route in the EU” (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1169–99. Another example is the attitudes to hormones in meat, see J Scott, “On kith and kine (and crustaceans): trade and environment in the EU and WTO” in J H H Weiler, The EU, the WTO and NAFTA (Oxford: OUP 2000), pp. 125–67; EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaints by the USA and Canada (WT/DS26/R; WT/DS48/R 18 August 1997).
intervention. In a large number of cases concerning food and alcohol labelling,\textsuperscript{118} the Court has consistently held, applying the stronger version of the proportionality test, that providing consumer information (the second rung of the intervention ladder, after only the “do nothing” of unregulated free trade) is a proportionate response to public health concerns, and, crucially, that anything else is disproportionate. But, as Brownsword et al. point out, interventions that are information-based (such as nutrition labelling, anti-smoking adverts or drink-driving campaigns) may have the effect of increasing social inequalities.\textsuperscript{119} Labelling of food or alcohol relies on the consumer’s ability to read and understand the labels, and translate the information presented into choices about which products to consume. More advantaged groups in society are more likely to be able to do this and thus avail themselves of health protection or promotion advice. Other factors, such as availability, convenience, presentation, familiarity, price and palatability, may play a significant role in consumer choices,\textsuperscript{120} and because of this states may justifiably (in a stewardship sense) seek to regulate any or all of these through measures higher up the intervention ladder, such as prohibiting certain additives or restricting choice through restricting places where products may lawfully be sold.\textsuperscript{121}

However, both in cases where the detriments to public health arising from the product or service relating to the product are contested\textsuperscript{122} and in those, such as with respect to tobacco, where they are known and agreed upon,\textsuperscript{123} the Court’s reasoning remains trapped within the (liberal) frame of constitutional asymmetry, where the individual is conceptualised as a consumer within a market, and regulatory activities that restrict free trade must be justified as exceptions to the rule of freedom. Given that the EU legislature, or, better, the governments of the member states in treaty-revision processes, in practice are unable to reconnect the text of the law with scientific and/or social and cultural developments in understanding of public health risks, the Court should be slow to adopt the productive disconnection approach, but rather should fix the disconnections by

\textsuperscript{118} See, for instance, Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, n. 7 above; Case 261/81 Rauf [1982] ECR 3961; Case 94/82 De Kikkower Groothandel-Import-Export [1983] ECR 947; Case 178/84 Commission v Germany (Beer Purity), n. 7 above; Case 274/87 Commission v Germany (Meat Products) [1989] ECR 229; Case C-67/88 Commission v Italy (Edible Fats) [1990] ECR I-4285; Case 407/85 Drei Glocken [1988] ECR 4233; Case C-17/93 Van der Velden [1994] ECR I-3537; Case C-123/00 Bellamy [2001] ECR I-2795; Case C-14/00 Commission v Italy (Chocolate) [2003] ECR I-513; Joined cases C-421/00, C-426/00 and C-16/01 Sterbenz and Haag [2003] ECR I-1065; Case C-24/00 Commission v France (Red Bull), n. 112 above; Case C-270/02 Commission v Italy (Sports Food) [2004] ECR I-1559; Joined Cases C-158/04 and C-159/04 Alfa Vita [2006] ECR I-8135; Case C-319/05 Commission v Germany (Garlic Capsules) [2007] ECR I-9811; Case C-446/08 Solgar Vitamin’s France [2010] ECR I-3973. For critique, see Weatherill, “Recent case law”, n. 41 above; von Heydebrand u d Lasa, “Free movement”, n. 41 above; Brouwer, “Free movement”, n. 41 above; MacMaoláin, “Waiter”, n. 41 above; Unberath and Johnston, “The double-headed approach”, n. 41 above.


\textsuperscript{120} Nuffield Report, n. 8 above, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{121} See, for instance, the Swedish rules on the sale of alcohol, Case C-434/04 Abokainen and Leppik, n. 85 above.

\textsuperscript{122} See, for instance, Case C-24/00 Red Bull, n. 112 above.

\textsuperscript{123} See e.g. Joined Cases 177 & 178/82 van de Haar [1984] ECR I-1797; Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I [2000] ECR I-8419; Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453; Case C-380/03 Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European Union Tobacco Advertising II [2006] ECR I-11573; Case C-74/99 R v Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others [2000] ECR I-08599; Case C-197/08 Commission v France (Tobacco Retail Prices) [2010] ECR I-1599; Case C-198/08 Commission v Austria (Tobacco Retail Prices) [2010] ECR I-1645; Case C-221/08 Commission v Ireland (Tobacco Retail Prices) [2010] ECR I-1669; Case C-571/08 Commission v Italy (Tobacco Prices) 24 June 2010 nyr in ECR.
intelligent purposive reconnection/creative interpretation of internal market law. That would be to adopt a super-stewardship approach.

Conclusion

The article has shown the extent to which Brownsword et al.’s notion of stewardship provides an appropriate analytical model for critique of the EU’s law and policy in the public health field. Having reviewed six key objections to the use of stewardship as such a model, the article concludes that stewardship can play such a role, provided that the concept of stewardship is modified to super-stewardship, to take account of the differences between the EU and the state. Super-stewardship relies on the idea of ladders of intervention, to assess whether regulatory interventions and restrictions on individual autonomy and choice are justified, and whether the relevant policy-making institutions have been involved in a particular regulatory decision concerning public health. A preliminary assessment suggests that much EU-level law and policy making on public health can be justified by reference to this analytical model, although there are some areas where the justification for EU involvement has not (yet) been made out.

Super-stewardship also relies on the ideas of intelligent purposive reconnection and productive disconnection to assess whether courts (and in particular the Court) have properly exercised their stewardship obligations with respect to judicial decision-making that concerns the balance between public health interests and other interests. Given the relationship between public health protection and promotion and the EU’s internal market law, the most important judicial decisions concerning such balancing involve restrictions on free trade within the EU’s internal market that are aimed to protect or promote public health. Such restrictions involve, for instance, limitations on by whom, or when, or where, or how, certain products, or advertising services for such products, may be traded. Relevant products that may involve hazard to public health include, in particular, blood and human tissue, pharmaceuticals, food, alcohol and tobacco. The place of the law of the internal market within the EU’s constitutional arrangements requires a much greater emphasis on purposive reconnection than implied by Brownsword’s idea of stewardship as applied to courts in national contexts. In a preliminary analysis, the article has shown that, in interpreting internal market law, the Court of Justice of the EU does not always successfully play its role as a super-steward of public health in the EU.